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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




DEBORAH ANN FAIRCHILD, 
 












          NO. 44530 
 
          Kootenai County Case No.  
          CR-2015-17195 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Must this Court decline to consider Fairchild’s claim that the district court abused 
its discretion by ordering as a condition of probation that Fairchild either maintain full-
time employment or attend school full-time, subject to her probation officer’s discretion, 
because Fairchild did not seek modification of the condition of probation below and the 
district court’s imposition of the condition was not fundamental error? 
 
 
Fairchild’s Challenge To An Un-objected To Condition Of Probation Is Not Properly 
Before This Court 
 
 Fairchild pled guilty to burglary, and the district court withheld judgment and 
placed Fairchild on probation for four years.  (R., pp.61-64.)  As a condition of probation, 
 2 
the district court ordered that Fairchild “make every effort to obtain and maintain full time 
employment or be enrolled in a full time educational program,” subject to her probation 
officer’s discretion.  (R., p.63; 9/6/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.17-22.)  Fairchild accepted the terms 
of probation on the record in open court and at no time raised any objection or 
otherwise moved to modify the conditions imposed by the district court.  (9/6/16 Tr., 
p.37, L.5 – p.43, L.21; see generally R.)  Fairchild filed a notice of appeal timely from the 
order withholding judgment.  (R., pp.65-68.)   
“Mindful of the precedent holding that a defendant must challenge a probation 
term in district court in order for such an issue to be considered on appeal,” Fairchild 
argues for the first time on appeal that the “district court erred when it ordered that [her] 
probation officer would have discretion over whether she worked full-time or attended 
school full-time.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.1; see also pp.3-4.)  Fairchild’s claim is not properly 
before this Court because she specifically accepted this condition of probation, without 
objection, in open court; she never moved for a modification of this condition of 
probation below; and the trial court’s imposition of this condition of probation does not 
constitute fundamental error.     
Pursuant to I.C. § 20-221(1), the trial court may modify any terms or conditions of 
probation at any time.  Additionally, any party may submit to the court a request to 
modify the terms and conditions of probation for any probationer under the board's 
supervision at any time during the period of probation.  I.C. § 20-221(2).   
The proper forum for Fairchild to complain about a term of her probation is the 
district court.  If Fairchild thought the condition that her probation officer have discretion 
to decide whether she would attend school full-time or work full-time was unreasonable, 
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she was free to decline probation and demand to have her sentence executed.  State v. 
Tesheep, 122 Idaho 759, 760, 838 P.2d 888, 889 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. 
Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 861, 952 P.2d 350, 358 (1969)).  Alternatively, she could have 
filed (and, in fact, still could file) a motion asking the district court to modify the probation 
condition.  Having failed to avail herself of either option, she failed to preserve the issue 
for appeal.  State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992); State v. 
Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991); State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 
813, 816, 932 P.2d 936, 939 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that because defendant failed to 
object to restitution as a condition of probation or file a motion to modify the terms and 
conditions of probation, defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal). 
It is well-settled that “Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 
961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125, 129 
(1995)); accord State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173, 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013).  An 
exception to this rule exists if the alleged error constitutes fundamental error.  Perry, 
150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976.  The Idaho Supreme Court has clarified that “all 
claims of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now subject to the fundamental error 
test set forth in Perry.”  Carter, 155 Idaho at 173, 307 P.3d at 190; see also Carter, 155 
Idaho at 174, 307 P.3d at 191 (holding “the fundamental error test is the proper standard 
for determining whether an appellate court may hear claims based upon unobjected-to 
error in all phases of criminal proceedings in the trial courts of this state”).  However, the 
burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the defendant asserting 
the error for the first time on appeal.  Perry 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  To carry 
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that burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal must demonstrate 
the error she alleges “(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) 
plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision); and (3) was not harmless.”  Id., quoted in Carter, 155 Idaho at 173, 307 P.3d 
at 190.   
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case shows Fairchild 
waived appellate consideration of her challenge to a condition of her probation.  As set 
forth above, Fairchild never objected to or moved to modify the conditions of her 
probation below, nor has she even argued on appeal that the sentencing court’s 
unobjected-to decision to require the probation officer to have discretion over whether 
she would attend school full-time or work full-time constitutes fundamental error under 
the standards articulated in Perry, supra.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.1-4.)  
Even if she had, the claim would fail under the first prong of Perry, which requires 
Fairchild to demonstrate a violation of one or more of her unwaived constitutional rights.  
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  Fairchild has not cited any constitutional right 
she believes is implicated in relation to her complaint, much less established a clear 
violation of any constitutional right.   
Fairchild may yet file a motion to modify the conditions of her probation.  
However, because the issue was not raised below, and because Fairchild has not even 
asserted fundamental error, much less carried her burden of establishing it, this Court 
must decline to consider the merits of Fairchild’s claim that the trial court abused its 
discretion by requiring, as a condition of her probation, that she either maintain full-time 
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employment or attend school full-time, subject to her probation officer’s discretion. The 
order withholding judgment, and the probation terms incorporated therein, must 
therefore be affirmed.  
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the order withholding 
judgment.      




      _/s/ Lori A. Fleming__________________ 
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